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Foreword
Today, more than at any point in time, protecting civilians has come to the forefront of UN 
peace operations. Military forces, civilian and humanitarian actors are working in different 
ways to protect civilians from the catastrophic consequences of war and armed conflict. 
Through common strategies for the protection of civilians, military and civilian components 
are using different means to achieve this common goal. In this, mutual support, coordination 
and good communication are the keys to success. Tailor-made operational designs, flexible 
application of the full spectrum of relevant responses – always adapted to the context on the 
ground – can help improve future UN peace operations’ ability to protect. The Threat-Based 
Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations applies these principles and 
provides practitioners at all levels with a new and innovative practical tool. There is no doubt that it will greatly help 
the UN’s efforts to deliver better on what has become its core  mandate: protecting civilians from the scourge of 
violence and war.
Hilde Frafjord Johnson
Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to South Sudan and member of the UN Secretary-General’s High 
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.
In spite of criticism and even distrust of them, UN peace operations have proven to be a 
relevant tool for maintaining and providing peace and stability in complex armed conflicts. 
Yet military leaders acknowledge the intrinsic limitations of military power and the use 
of force. Force alone cannot create lasting peace in conflicts in which armed actors target 
civilians. Yet, the ability to apply adequate force to protect civilians remains a prerequisite for 
lasting peace, in UN peace operations as well as any others. This demands an improved ability 
to understand the nature of threats against civilians. Why are civilians being attacked? What 
happens if the attackers succeed? How can military forces be used to protect them? 
The Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations provides 
the UN with a tool for more efficient peace operations, introducing a conceptual framework for military planners and 
practitioners that can easily be shared and used across missions. 
Robert Mood
Lieutenant General, Former Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and 
Chief Military Observer and Head of Mission of United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria.
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1  Introduction
User guide
This chapter introduces the threat-based approach to protection of civilians (POC), describes its purpose and scope, 
and outlines the structure of the document. 
Background. Despite being a priority task, protection of civilians (POC) has proven difficult to implement on the 
ground due to a lack of theoretical and practical guidance for military actors. To fill these gaps, the United Nations (UN) 
has recently developed an overarching POC policy, as well as implementing guidelines, strategies and concepts,  
offering UN military components guidance on how to implement POC mandates (see Annex A: Recommended  
reading). However, more practical advice for military units at the operational and tactical levels is still lacking. This  
document therefore aims at complementing existing UN POC guidance with a threat-based approach to protection  
of civilians, focusing on the specific challenges that military commanders are confronted with in missions. 
Definition. In UN peace operations, a POC mandate authorizes use of  ‘all necessary means, up to and including the 
use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabil-
ities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host-government’ (POC Policy, 2015). 
This definition implies that military forces play a crucial role in the implementation of POC mandates. 
Joint responsibility. All components of a UN peace operation, including the military, have a joint responsibility to 
implement protection mandates. UN multidimensional peace operations have a range of instruments at their disposal 
that can be used to improve civilian security. This requires each component to consider how best to utilize its  
particular assets and capabilities in cooperation with other protection actors, both within and outside the UN. Some of 
the complementary components are discussed in this document, because they represent important partners and force 
multipliers for the military component.
Threat analysis. A key characteristic of current operational environments is that civilians are being deliberately  
targeted by armed actors. In some cases, such attacks on civilians result from specific strategies aimed at the  
extermination or expelling of entire groups or communities. However, in most cases, armed groups, abusive authorities 
and rogue militias use violence against civilians to survive, to undermine political opposition or to secure economic 
rewards and other benefits. Different types of perpetrators and rationales often co-exist within the same area of  
operation. Distinguishing between different types of threats and determining the potential role and utility of military 
force is therefore essential to improve UN military efforts to protect civilians. 
1.1 Purpose
Enhanced understanding of military protection. The threat-based approach to POC is meant to help UN military 
commanders, planners and practitioners at all levels of the UN system to understand how the military component of a 
UN peace operation can use military force more effectively to protect civilians from different types of physical threats. 
Shared understanding of threats to civilians. The threat-based approach may also provide other actors within and 
outside the UN with a structured and generic way of understanding threats to civilians. For example, it can be used 
at the strategic level in UN HQ to help identify different types of threats against civilians before deploying troops or 
designing an appropriate POC strategy. 
Threat prioritization tool. UN military components should always prioritize the greatest and most imminent threat 
to civilians in order to protect as many people as possible. By using the threat-based approach, it is possible to make 
better sense of how perpetrators behave, which in turn may help identify and prioritize the most imminent threats as 
well as the most appropriate responses. 
1.2 Scope
Physical protection. Physical protection not only includes eliminating threats, but also reducing civilian  
vulnerabilities. Protection can in other words be achieved in a variety of ways, for example by reducing the number  
of attacks against civilians, by facilitating everyday civilian life through area security, by reducing the presence of small 
arms, by removing illegal checkpoints, or by assisting humanitarian actors in their protection efforts.  
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The role of the military component. This document focuses on the role of the military component in UN peace  
operations with a POC mandate. The host-state will always have the primary responsibility for protecting its own 
population, but, when the host-state fails to do so, the military component is the UN mission’s most important tool to 
provide physical protection to civilians. 
1.3 Outline
Chapter 2: POC scenarios. This chapter presents eight generic POC scenarios that describe various types of threats 
ranging from the least violent situations (MOB VIOLENCE) to the most violent (GENOCIDE). These eight scenarios are 
based on an extensive number of case studies of former conflicts and operations over the past 25 years, and the  
different types of perpetrators that civilians and intervening military forces have been confronted with in these  
operations. In combination, the scenarios aim to capture the full range of potential physical threats to civilians  
(although new scenarios may emerge in the future). 
Chapter 3: Threat analysis. This chapter proposes five questions and four factors that may help analysts identify 
which of these eight scenarios civilians are confronted with. It also offers a checklist containing early warning  
indicators. This chapter may be particularly useful for Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMAC) / Joint Operations Centers 
(JOC) and UN intelligence personnel/U2/J2.
Chapter 4: Military planning. This chapter provides advice for military planners at the strategic and operational levels. 
The chapter outlines the aspects to consider during the ‘mission analysis phase’ and the ‘courses of action development 
phase’. 
Chapter 5: Tactical responses. This chapter lists different threats at the tactical level and suggests appropriate  
responses. It is structured according to the UN’s four-phased response model (prevention, pre-emption, response and 
consolidation) and the eight POC scenarios introduced in Chapter 2. The main audience is military practitioners at the 
operational and tactical levels in-mission. 
Chapter 6: Monitoring and evaluation. This chapter suggests five ways to monitor and evaluate efforts to protect  
civilians, and provides relevant metrics for each scenario. This chapter may be particularly useful for JMAC/JOC  
personnel and other practitioners with the task of reporting on the progress of UN military efforts to protect. 
Annex A provides a list of recommended reading, including current UN guidance.
8 of 44
2 Scenarios
User guide
This chapter presents eight generic POC scenarios, ranging from MOB VIOLENCE (least violent) to GENOCIDE (most 
violent), representing fundamentally different types of threats to civilians. In combination, they aim to capture the 
full range of possible threats that a UN mission can be expected to protect civilians from. This chapter is used as 
a baseline for the remaining chapters in this document, and it is recommended to read the scenarios thoroughly 
before proceeding to other chapters. 
Categorizing threats. The eight POC scenarios introduced here systematize the complexity of violence against  
civilians by breaking it down into generic categories. This categorization is meant to facilitate systematic analysis of 
perpetrator behavior and strategies to inform POC planning, POC responses, and POC monitoring and evaluation  
within a whole-of-mission UN approach.
Key characteristics. The scenarios have been drawn up using five parameters that describe the characteristics of  
violent perpetrators: (i) actor type, (ii) rationale for attacking civilians, (iii) strategies and tactics used, (iv) relevant 
military capabilities to attack civilians, and (v) the expected outcome in terms of human suffering, if the perpetrators 
succeed.
The following section describes each scenario, ranging from the least to the most dangerous in terms of the scale and 
intensity of violence against civilians. Examples from previous UN operations are also provided for each scenario. The 
main characteristics of each of these scenarios are summarized in Table 2.1 at the end of the chapter.
Words of caution
The scenarios are only generic descriptions of what perpetrators of violence may do. In many armed conflicts,  
perpetrators display more than one strategic rationale for attacking civilians. Also, their rationales can vary across 
time and space. This mosaic of rationales can cause confusion to those aiming to protect civilians in a certain  
geographical area. Future conflicts may also see other types of scenarios emerge. For example, it is still unclear 
whether and how UN peace operations may provide protection against violent extremism (such as ISIS and Boko 
Haram).
 
2.1 Mob violence
In this scenario, rioting individuals and/or loosely organized groups of civilians (usually in mobs) destroy property and 
harm civilians. Personal gain, revenge and political discord may all form part of the rationale in this primarily  
opportunistic form of violence against civilians. Small-scale skirmishes prior to elections and/or major political events 
can trigger mob violence. Planned demonstrations may also get out of hand. In these situations, civilians can be  
targeted randomly or intentionally, but relatively few people are likely to be killed, because the perpetrators neither 
seek to maximize violence nor possess the means to do so. The presence of violent mobs will often lead to a general 
perception of instability, although national and/or international security forces are often able to defuse these situations 
effectively. Individuals or loosely organized mobs will generally have limited means to threaten UN troops. Freedom 
of movement is essential to such perpetrators, second only to the ability to gather together. This scenario rarely leads 
to more strategic violence against civilians, but can lead to more serious incidents if manipulated by political actors 
seeking to destabilize the security situation. It may also strain the mission’s resources, which could be used to greater 
effect elsewhere.
Previous cases with UN involvement: Liberia (mid-2000s), DRC (2013, 2015).
2.2 Post-conflict revenge
This scenario typically occurs in post-conflict environments when former victims take revenge against previous 
violent perpetrators. This scenario can be triggered by a turn of events in which former perpetrators are dramatically 
weakened, overthrown or have capitulated. This type of post-conflict revenge violence is often enabled by weak state 
capacities unable to ensure basic security from criminal violence. The violence may also be accompanied by a general 
rise in other criminal acts of violence (e.g. murder, arson, looting, kidnapping). The perpetrators will usually be  
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individuals or loosely organized mobs seeking to settle scores on a personal basis. Targets are selected on the basis of 
previous culpability, especially in those areas where most abuses occurred before. Relatively few people will be killed in 
total (dozens or hundreds), but even low levels of violence can prompt many people to flee if the current victims share 
a common identity with former perpetrators.
Previous cases with UN involvement: Kosovo (post-1999), Iraq (post-2003).
2.3 Insurgency
In this scenario, civilians are targeted as a means to control the population or to undermine the ruling government 
or other armed groups. The perpetrators are typically armed groups fighting for political power. Government forces 
or rival groups are the primary targets of attack, but insurgents still employ a combination of selective violence (e.g. 
assassinations) to prevent the population from collaborating with the enemy and indiscriminate attacks (improvised 
explosive devices – IEDs) against civilians and rivals alike. Attacks may also be intended to prompt an overreaction 
from government forces. Often the perpetrators set out their justification for targeting individuals or groups of people 
who are legally defined as civilians (e.g. government officials, governors, police services who do not partake in military 
operations). 
Such violence is mainly a concern for civilians in the contested areas; the majority of the civilian population will have 
other grievances (e.g. unemployment, corruption). The number of people killed will be relatively low compared to 
‘reversed’ scenarios, i.e. where governments, not rebel groups, are the main perpetrator (GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, 
ETHNIC CLEANSING, GENOCIDE). When people flee, they usually flee from the presence of fighting rather than from 
the presence of insurgents per se. The scenario may see peaks in violence in certain areas or at certain times. Military 
operations against insurgent groups may increase the threat they pose to civilians because of the risk of retaliation for 
perceived collaboration. Also, case-specific variations, especially where the conflict runs along ethnic divisions, may 
lead to more violent insurgencies (such as happened in Syria). However, as long as the perpetrators target civilians only 
in order to undermine the government or other armed groups, it is likely that their use of violence against civilians will 
be relatively limited. 
Previous cases with UN involvement: Mali (2013–present), DRC (2012–2013). 
2.4 Predatory violence
In this scenario, armed groups attack the local population to ensure their own survival or profit. Perpetrators are  
typically insurgents who have failed to obtain their original political objectives, but have refused to demobilize or  
disarm. Being physically removed from the geographic areas in which they have support, they are less constrained 
from engaging in predatory behavior (pillage, forced recruitment, illegal taxation). The perpetrators may also be rogue 
government security forces that lack the logistical support and finances to feed and pay their own troops. Both  
perpetrator types will lack popular support and alienate the population in their areas of operation. All civilians are 
the potential victims of predatory violence. The use of excessive violence such as mutilation of body parts or torture 
is common to instill fear in the population. Attacks are usually launched on the basis of opportunity, preferring ‘easy,’ 
undefended targets, especially women and children. Relatively few people are actually killed, but the number of  
abductees and the displaced will often be high due to the brutality and unpredictability of attacks. There may be no 
clear geographical patterns in terms of where attacks take place, other than that they are in areas where potential  
rewards are high and resistance low. If predatory actors are also involved in communal conflict, this scenario can  
become very violent.
Previous cases with UN involvement: Lord’s Resistance Army, FARDC, ADF and the Democratic Forces for the  
Liberation of Rwanda in DRC (1999–present).
2.5 Communal conflict
Communal conflict may occur when whole communities engage in continuous cycles of violence, driven by a  
combination of revenge and self-protection. Because both parties of the conflict are loosely organized communities 
rather than highly organized armed actors, they do not possess the means required to settle conflicts permanently. 
Their armed strength is often similar. Neither party can afford not to retaliate, as this will invite further attacks upon 
themselves. Both parties perceive and portray their use of violence as necessary for self-defense. Conflict may persist for  
years or even decades, with periodic escalations in violence, beyond the ‘normal’ patterns of cattle raids, skirmishes, etc. 
10 of 44
These escalations can be linked to rising tensions over access to land, water, cattle or other means of survival or  
political manipulation. 
In communal conflicts, civilians are both the primary targets and the main perpetrators, as the roles of perpetrator 
and victim shift with each cycle. The targeting is based on the civilians’ communal identity or perceived communal 
identity. Women and children are more often victims. Open declarations of intent to exterminate or expel the other 
community, as the only viable solution to defend themselves, may occur. In such cases, a high number of casualties 
relative to the community’s total population can be expected, as well as rapid displacement of entire communities 
fleeing from impending attacks. The tactics used are often very destructive despite limited means (e.g. killing rather 
than capturing people, destroying homes and means of survival, targeting the most populated urban locations with 
indiscriminate bombs, sexual violence, etc.). If a communal actor gains the upper hand, this scenario may escalate 
into ETHNIC CLEANSING or even (acts of ) GENOCIDE, as the objective may be to expel or exterminate the opposing 
community. However, as long as a balance of armed power is maintained, each side will lack the means to engage in 
ETHNIC CLEANSING or GENOCIDE. This dynamic of power balances has particular importance for protection actors 
during disarmament campaigns.
Previous cases with UN involvement: Mali (the Tuareg vs. Fulani), South Sudan (the Lou Nuer vs. Murle, between 
Dinka sub-clans in Lakes State), Abyei (the Misserya vs. Ngok Dinka) and DRC (Hema vs. Lendu).
2.6 Government repression
Government repression may occur when the ruling government or a de facto authority is pressured politically and 
resorts to violence to secure its own survival. Civilians are primarily targeted according to presumed or real affiliation 
with the political opposition, not on the basis of ethnic or sectarian identity, although communal identity may be  
used as a proxy for targeting political opposition. Violence will be most severe where opposition is perceived to be  
strongest, e.g. where known opposition members hide and/or operate. The principal threat to civilians comes from  
the indiscriminate tactics and means used to suppress both armed and unarmed resistance (e.g. conventional  
weapons against civilian areas). The number of people killed or displaced will first and foremost vary according to the 
local level of fighting. Combatants are equally or more at risk of being killed than civilians. This scenario may lead to 
ETHNIC CLEANSING or even acts of GENOCIDE, as long as the government’s survival continues to be threatened.
Previous cases with UN involvement: Côte d’Ivoire (2010–2011), Syria (2012–present).
2.7 Ethnic cleansing
Ethnic cleansing may occur when a militarily superior actor (ethnic, tribal, sectarian or national) seeks to expel a certain 
group from a specific territory. The perpetrators are likely to be states or de facto authorities considering the nature of 
the objective and means required. Ethnic cleansing can be recognized by a rising number of ambiguous statements 
from political and military leaders about having to expel a certain community, seeking to inflame violence against 
another communal group, while avoiding outside interference. Other indications are preparations to permanently 
displace a specific population (e.g. by seizing political power in areas where the targeted community is present, or  
preparing documents requiring the targeted population to relinquish entitlement to their homes). Such preparations 
may also include the increased arming, support and incorporation of paramilitaries, militias or special units by  
government authorities.
Violence is most likely to occur in areas in which the balance of power between communities is relatively even, in 
border areas with the perpetrators’ ethnic brethren, and in enclaves where the majority of civilians belong to the 
targeted community. The threat will be most imminent following seizures of new territory. Violence is primarily used 
as a demonstration at first to coerce the targeted group to leave. The destruction of homes can be used to prevent the 
return of the target population. Ethnic cleansing may be conducted simultaneously by different actors in the different 
areas that they control. Fewer people will die compared to GENOCIDE (only a few percent at most), but the number of 
displaced victims will usually be very high (about 90 percent). Ethnic cleansing may also escalate into isolated acts of 
GENOCIDE, especially if it further increases the targeted population’s incentives to flee.
Previous cases with UN involvement: Former Yugoslavia (1992–1999), Darfur (2003–), The Central African Republic 
(2014).
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2.8 Genocide
The most serious threat to civilians occurs when an actor aims to exterminate a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group. Only governments or actors with considerable financial and military capabilities are likely to possess the means 
required to kill the number of people needed to achieve this objective. In its early phases, even pre-genocide,  
perpetrators will dehumanize the targeted group of civilians (for example through hate-speech). Political and military 
leaders (future perpetrators) will also seek to secure greater control over the armed forces and the security  
services. When genocide commences, perpetrators no longer pursue alternative solutions (e.g. expelling or controlling 
a population). Civilians from the targeted group will be under imminent threat of violence wherever they can be found, 
especially early in the crisis and in areas of large concentrations. Unlike with ETHNIC CLEANSING, genocidal violence is 
not intended to force people to flee, but is aimed at killing as many as possible before they can escape. Increased  
mobilization and arming of paramilitaries, militias or special units by state authorities will occur. Potential victims 
might be congregated gradually in certain locations (e.g. as a result of threats or rumors). If the perpetrators succeed, 
the expected outcome is that a majority of potential victims will be killed, sometimes as many as 60–70 percent.  
A failed genocide may convert into ETHNIC CLEANSING, GOVERNMENT REPRESSION and COMMUNAL CONFLICT.
Previous cases with UN involvement: Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica in Bosnia (1995).
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Scenario Actor type Rationale Strategies and 
tactics
Necessary  
perpetrator 
capabilities
Expected  
outcome
Mob violence 
 
Liberia (’04, ’05, 
’09, ’11, ’15) 
 
Ivory Coast (’04) 
 
Sierra Leone 
(’00, ’02) 
 
DRC (’13, ’15)
Individuals or 
mobs
To exploit mob 
dynamics for 
personal gain,  
revenge or  
political influence
Non- or semi- 
organized  
criminal acts, 
such as murder, 
arson, looting
Freedom of 
movement 
Few killed, but 
possibly  
extensive  
material damage 
to property and 
general  
perception of 
insecurity
Post-conflict 
revenge 
 
Kosovo (post-’99)  
 
Iraq (post-’03)
Individuals or 
mobs
To avenge past 
crimes on a  
personal basis
Tit-for-tat 
score-settling 
through criminal 
acts of violence, 
such as murder, 
arson, kidnap-
ping, looting
Freedom of 
movement for 
individuals and 
small groups to 
access victims
Few killed (doz-
ens, hundreds), 
but groups  
associated with 
previous  
perpetrators may 
flee following 
relatively little 
violence
Insurgency 
 
Mali (’13–’15) 
DRC (’12–’13)  
 
S. Sudan (’12–’13) 
Rebel groups 
(classic  
insurgents with 
political or  
ideological  
objectives)
To control  
populations  
upon which they 
depend and 
undermine trust 
in their rivals
Selective and 
indiscriminate 
violence, through 
threats, targeted 
killings, bomb-
ings, retribution, 
depending on 
their level of 
control
Freedom of 
movement to 
pick time and 
place of attack, 
access to  
indiscriminate 
and explosive 
weapons
Fewer killed and 
injured than in 
many other  
scenarios, most 
due to indiscrim-
inate weapons; 
gradual displace-
ment from areas 
of heavy fighting
Predatory  
violence 
 
DRC (’99–’15)
Rebel groups 
(predatory  
behavior)
To survive or 
make a profit 
by exploiting 
civilians
Coerce civilians 
into compliance 
through plunder, 
taxation, forced 
recruitment, 
opportunistic 
rape, brutality, 
especially against 
‘easy targets’
Freedom of 
movement to 
pick time and 
place of attack, 
operational 
secrecy, often 
central command
Temporary, but 
large-scale, 
displacement in 
affected areas, 
disproportionate 
to the number of 
people actually 
attacked; many 
abductions,  
especially of 
young  
adolescents
Communal  
conflict
 
Mali (the Tuareg 
vs. Fulani) 
South Sudan 
(the Lou Nuer vs. 
Murle) 
Abyei (Misserya 
vs. Ngok Dinka) 
DRC (Hema vs. 
Lendu)
Whole tribal, 
ethnic or  
sectarian  
communities 
(possibly with 
outside support)
To avenge a  
previous attack 
and to deter 
further 
retribution in 
order to protect 
their own  
community
Attempts to 
coerce other 
community 
into submission 
through  
massacres, 
abductions, 
raids, destruction 
of homes and 
means of  
survival, often 
seeking to  
maximize  
violence
Freedom of 
movement to 
reach other  
community, 
access to  
deadlier weapons 
is associated with 
higher number of 
deaths
Relatively high 
number of  
people killed 
and abducted 
on both sides, 
especially  
women and 
children;  
livelihoods stolen 
or destroyed; 
temporary 
displacement in 
homogeneous 
areas, gradual 
withdrawal to 
‘their own’ in 
mixed areas
Table 2.1 Protection of civilians scenarios
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Scenario Actor type Rationale Strategies and 
tactics
Necessary  
perpetrator 
capabilities
Expected  
outcome
Government 
repression 
 
Ivory Coast 
(’10–’11)  
Syria (’12– 
present)
Authoritarian 
regimes, or de 
facto authorities 
in an area
To control  
restless  
populations, 
on basis of real 
or perceived 
affiliation with 
opposition
Repress  
population, 
through selective 
and indiscrim-
inate violence, 
threats,  
detention, rape 
as terror,  
destruction, 
occasional  
massacres
Command 
and control for 
governments, 
freedom of 
movement for 
regular forces, 
heavy weapons, 
special/irregular 
units in support
Mostly  
combatant 
deaths,  
gradual increase 
in civilian deaths 
due to heavy 
weapons and in 
accordance with 
intensity of  
fighting,  
large-scale  
displacement, 
widespread  
destruction 
of population 
centers
Ethnic cleansing 
Bosnia (’92–’95) 
Central African 
Republic (’14) 
States, or the 
militarily superior 
actor
To expel a certain 
group from a 
specific territory
Force targeted 
group to leave 
through threats, 
highly visible 
killings,  
brutality,  
mass-rape, 
destruction of 
property
Command and 
control, freedom 
of movement for 
irregular units, 
regular units for 
military control
Only a few per 
cent killed, but 
the vast majority 
of the  
targeted  
population 
expelled (~90 %); 
destruction of 
victim homes 
and cultural 
buildings
Genocide
  
Rwanda (’94)  
Srebrenica in 
Bosnia (’95)
States, or the 
militarily superior 
actor
To exterminate a 
certain group
Destroy  
existence of a 
group through 
several,  
simultaneous 
mass-killings,  
deportation, 
camps,  
systematic rape 
to prevent  
reproduction
Command and 
control, freedom 
of movement for 
special/ irregular 
units, sufficient 
small arms
Majority of 
members of the 
targeted group 
killed (50+ %), in  
relatively short 
time
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3  Threat analysis
User guide
This chapter introduces a two-step approach to analyzing the different types of threats against civilians. This threat 
analysis is meant to help planners identify which of the eight scenarios introduced in Chapter 2 a mission is  
confronted with.
Step one consists of five questions intended to capture the nature of the perpetrator. Step two consists of four  
operational factors (time, space, force and civilian coping strategies) important for understanding the nature of  
the threat. 
By analyzing these questions and factors, it should be possible to determine the dominant scenario in a particular 
area of operations (recalling that there will likely be more than one scenario at play). A fictional map is provided, 
suggesting how different threats may be distributed across a region. 
At the end of the chapter, a list of early warning indicators for each scenario is provided. 
This chapter should be particularly relevant for UN JMAC / UN JOC and UN intelligence personnel (U2/J2).
Analyzing the environment. During the early phases of any planning process, it is essential to gain awareness of and 
knowledge about the main characteristics of the crisis. In military terms, this phase is often referred to as the analysis of 
the operating environment. The purpose of this phase is to identify and analyze the factors that can influence mandate 
implementation. 
Need for information. The threat-based approach may be helpful in developing and structuring information needs 
at the strategic level, although it is no substitute for deeper analyses of the crisis. At mission level, it can be used to 
develop collection plans and  situational awareness through JMACs, JOCs, All-Source Information Fusion Units, U2/J2- 
capabilities and other mission components. 
Common understanding across components. A common understanding of the operational environment and threats 
against civilians should ideally be shared across all components of a UN mission and at the different levels of the 
organization. The threat-based approach provides a structured and generic framework for threat analysis. This gives 
military planners a tool to ease the exchange of information across the various planning bodies involved in integrated 
planning processes. 
3.1 Key questions
Threats against civilians. If civilians are being targeted, planners and analysts should at an early stage identify the 
particular nature of the perpetrator(s). Experience has shown that an armed actor may behave differently in various 
geographical areas. The conflict may also involve multiple perpetrators with various rationales for attacking civilians. 
Most perpetrators use a combination of violent tactics, but each particular rationale usually favors certain tactics.  
Analyzing the modus operandi of each perpetrator is therefore crucial to uncover the motivations for attacking  
civilians and identify the relevant scenario. Statements from both perpetrators and victims can often be misleading. 
Importantly, the roles of perpetrators or victims may also change when military actions to protect civilians are  
undertaken. Thus, monitoring changes in threats to civilians is vital.
Below are five questions that will help planners to identify the nature of the perpetrator, based on the characteristics 
from the scenarios described in Chapter 2. A list of possible answers provides clues as to which scenario(s) one may be 
faced with.
N.B. In most armed conflicts, the majority of threats to civilians will come in the form of injuries, sexual violence,  
displacement, threats, looting and abductions, not killings. 
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Actor type
What type of actor is responsible for the violence against civilians?
•	 States	or	the	militarily	strongest	actors	(GENOCIDE,	ETHNIC	CLEANSING,	GOVERNMENT	REPRESSION)
•	 Organized	armed	groups	(PREDATORY	VIOLENCE,	INSURGENCY)
•	 Communities,	such	as	ethnic,	sectarian	or	tribal	(COMMUNAL	CONFLICT)
•	 Individuals/mobs	(MOB	VIOLENCE,	POST-CONFLICT	REVENGE)
N.B. ‘Who is killing whom’ will be obvious in some cases, but not always. While all sides are often responsible for  
violence against civilians, past cases show that one party is usually responsible for the majority of casualties,  
especially early in a conflict.
Rationale
What is the perpetrator’s rationale for attacking civilians?
•	 Extermination	(GENOCIDE)
•	 Expulsion	(ETHNIC	CLEANSING)
•	 Control	of	population	to	crush	political	opposition	(GOVERNMENT	REPRESSION)
•	 Revenge	for	past	crimes	(POST-CONFLICT	REVENGE)
•	 Deterrence	and	revenge	for	previous	round	of	fighting	(COMMUNAL	CONFLICT)
•	 Survival	and/or	profit	(PREDATORY	VIOLENCE)
•	 Control	of	population	for	support	and/or	to	undermine	opponents	(INSURGENCY)
•	 Revenge,	protest,	personal	gain	(MOB	VIOLENCE)
N.B. Planners should also assess how important the targeting of civilians is as part of an actor’s overall strategy.  
Some strategies are more dependent on harming civilians (e.g. GENOCIDE) than others (e.g. MOB VIOLENCE).
Strategies and tactics
What strategies and tactics serve the perpetrator’s rationale most effectively?
•	 Mass	killing	(common	in	GENOCIDE,	ETHNIC	CLEANSING,	GOVERNMENT	REPRESSION,	COMMUNAL	CONFLICT),	 
 targeted assassinations (GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, INSURGENCY)
•	 Indiscriminate	attacks	resulting	in	civilian	casualties,	such	as	suicide	attacks,	car	bombs,	IEDs,	mortars,	artillery	 
 (INSURGENCY, GOVERNMENT REPRESSION)
•	 Scorched	earth	tactics,	such	as	destroying	populated	neighborhoods,	civilian	buildings,	fields	and	crops	 
 (COMMUNAL CONFLICT, ETHNIC CLEANSING, GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, GENOCIDE)
•	 Sieges,	entrapment,	starvation,	blocking	water,	cutting	electricity,	blockage	of	humanitarian	assistance	(GENOCIDE,	 
 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION)
•	 Cruel	treatment,	such	as	mutilation,	torture,	forced	limb	amputation,	starvation,	unlawful	detention	(PREDATORY	 
 VIOLENCE, GOVERNMENT REPRESSION)
•	 Sexual	and	gender-based	violence,	such	as	rape,	enforced	pregnancy,	sexual	slavery	(GOVERNMENT	REPRESSION,	 
 ETHNIC CLEANSING, PREDATORY VIOLENCE, COMMUNAL CONFLICT, INSURGENCY)
•	 Pillage,	looting	(PREDATORY	VIOLENCE)
•	 Abduction,	kidnappings,	disappearances,	forced	recruitment	(PREDATORY	VIOLENCE,	COMMUNAL	CONFLICT,	 
 POST-CONFLICT REVENGE)
N.B. Many of these acts of violence are likely to occur in most conflicts. However, in each scenario, certain strategies 
and tactics will be particularly relevant for the perpetrator’s rationale. A key lies in understanding the perpetrator’s 
modus operandi and identifying which acts of violence serves the strategic purpose most effectively.
Capabilities
Which capabilities are relevant to the perpetrator’s ability to attack civilians?
•	 Advance	planning	of	violence,	such	as	complete	blueprints	or	preparations	for	isolated	attacks	(GENOCIDE,	ETHNIC	 
 CLEANSING, GOVERNMENT REPRESSION)
•	 Top-down	coordination	of	violence,	such	as	command,	control,	communication,	leadership	(GENOCIDE,	ETHNIC	 
 CLEANSING, GOVERNMENT REPRESSION)
•	 Ambiguity	or	secrecy	surrounding	intent	to	target	civilians,	while	mobilizing	the	support	necessary	to	execute	the	 
 violence (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING)
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•	 Freedom	of	movement	for	those	executing	the	violence	(all	scenarios)
•	 Relevant	armed	units	and	weaponry,	such	as	conventional	armed	forces,	irregular	units,	small	arms,	IEDs	(varies	 
 according to the characteristics of each scenario)
N.B. All perpetrators need certain capabilities to use violence successfully. In order to reduce their ability to target 
civilians, planners must identify what capabilities are required and separate these capabilities from what are  
required to conduct other operations, such as fighting other armed actors, which may or may not be the same.
Expected outcome 
What is the expected outcome if the perpetrator succeeds?
•	 Most	members	of	the	targeted	group	killed	(+50	percent)	(GENOCIDE)
•	 Relatively	few	civilians	killed	in	total,	but	the	vast	majority	of	the	targeted	population	flees	(~90	percent)	(ETHNIC	 
 CLEANSING)
•	 Mostly	combatant	deaths,	but	gradual	increase	in	civilian	deaths	due	to	heavy	weapons	and	in	accordance	with	 
 intensity of fighting, large-scale displacement, widespread destruction of population centers (GOVERNMENT  
 REPRESSION)
•	 Relatively	high	number	of	people	killed	and	abducted	on	both	sides,	especially	women	and	children;	livelihoods	 
 stolen or destroyed; temporary displacement in homogeneous areas, more gradual withdrawal to ‘their own’  
 community in mixed areas (COMMUNAL CONFLICT)
•	 Temporary,	but	large-scale,	displacement	of	civilians	in	affected	areas	–disproportionately	many	relative	to	the	 
 number of people actually attacked; many abductions, especially of young adolescents (PREDATORY VIOLENCE)
•	 Few	killed	and	injured	compared	to	other	scenarios,	with	most	deaths	due	to	the	use	of	indiscriminate	weapons;	 
 gradual displacement from areas of heavy fighting; occasional peaks in violence/brutality (INSURGENCY)
•	 Relatively	few	killed	in	absolute	numbers	(dozens,	hundreds),	but	groups	associated	with	the	previous	perpetrators	 
 may flee following relatively low scale violence (POST-CONFLICT REVENGE)
•	 Few	killed	in	total,	but	extensive	material	damage	to	property	and	general	perception	of	insecurity	(MOB	VIOLENCE)
N.B. As outcomes and consequences for civilian security differ considerably, it is essential for commanders and  
military practitioners to be able to identify what kind of threat civilians are facing. Some scenarios are clearly more 
dangerous than others. Common to all is that failure to protect may jeopardize the legitimacy of the entire UN  
mission. 
3.2 Key factors
To further understand the nature of the threat, planners and analysts should always consider when (time), where 
(space), and from what/whom (force) the threat to civilians will be greatest within the area of operations. Civilian  
coping strategies should also be considered, as each individual/community has its particular ways of surviving violence 
that may influence how force may be used most effectively against it. The following section further illustrates how 
these four operational factors (time, space, force and civilian coping strategies) are relevant for an understanding of the 
nature of the threat.
Time: How imminent is the threat to civilians? 
A threat of physical violence against civilians may be considered ‘imminent’ when a potential aggressor is considered 
to have both the intent and capacity to inflict physical violence in a specific area or against a specific group of civilians. 
The threat to civilians will be most imminent in those scenarios in which perpetrators are dependent on attacking  
civilians as quickly as possible to achieve their objectives (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING). Once a conflict has broken 
out, these perpetrators tend to escalate violence against civilians very quickly, because gradual escalation may allow 
their intended victims to flee or mobilize resistance, or allow international intervention to occur before the  
perpetrators have achieved their objectives. The time-frame available may only be days or weeks. 
A threat to civilians may suddenly become imminent and then subside in situations where attacks against civilians are 
launched in response to certain conditions. Perpetrators may be driven to attack by the perceived loss of control over 
a population (GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, INSURGENCY), by the opportunity provided in an immediate post-conflict 
environment (POST-CONFLICT REVENGE), in retaliation for a previous attack (COMMUNAL CONFLICT), or by the lack 
of supplies (PREDATORY VIOLENCE). These actors do not pose an imminent threat in an entire area of operations, or at 
all times. Once the actors eventually do decide to attack, however, they will pose an imminent threat to civilians and 
require an immediate response from the military component. 
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Seasonal or environmental changes may also influence the imminence of a threat (e.g. rainy season preventing 
communities from launching attacks against distant neighbors or failed crops that may force rebel groups to prey on 
populations more often). Another relevant condition is local availability of early warning systems enabling information 
exchanges about imminent attacks both to victims and military forces (e.g. through text messages).
Space: Where is the threat most likely? 
Identifying ‘protection hot spots’ is always recommended. A protection hot spot is an area in which civilians are more 
likely to be attacked than in other areas. This practice enables more effective allocation of resources to protect civilians. 
Hot spots are always population centers (cities, towns, villages or neighborhoods). However, some populated areas will 
be more exposed than others, depending on the criteria according to which perpetrators select their targets.
Perpetrators targeting specific ethnic or sectarian groups (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, COMMUNAL CONFLICT) 
must attack geographical locations in which this group is present. The most likely hot spots in these scenarios will be 
minority enclaves inside perpetrator territory, corridors or pockets that link the perpetrator’s communal areas together, 
and border areas close to their communal brethren. Perpetrators targeting civilians based on affiliation with certain  
actors will target locations where this connection is strongest. This is likely to be areas in which an actor’s control is being 
challenged (GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, INSURGENCY) or past crimes were most frequent or severe (POST-CONFLICT 
REVENGE). In all these scenarios, it will be important to prioritize the deployment of forces to the most likely hot spots. 
By contrast, perpetrators who target civilians more randomly – either to reap the immediate benefits (PREDATORY 
VIOLENCE) or simply to destabilize the security situation (INSURGENCY) – will be relatively unlimited in where they may 
attack civilians, thus making it much harder to identify potential hot spots. In such cases, concentrating deployment to 
certain areas is not likely to increase the protection of civilians at large. 
The geographical shape of the operational theatre may also influence the location of attacks. Some scenarios are less 
likely under certain geographical conditions. For example, an island cannot be completely ethnically cleansed with-
out organizing transport or killing the entire target group. Furthermore, local scenarios may evolve within a different 
scenario. For example, perpetrators may escalate violence in isolated areas of particular strategic importance, e.g. 
by expelling or exterminating certain groups of civilians rather than suppressing them, to minimize the potential for 
resistance. This will create local scenarios, e.g. the act of GENOCIDE in Srebrenica, Bosnia (1995).
Force: Which military units or weapons are responsible for the violence against civilians? 
Planners should not restrict their analysis to the perpetrator’s military capabilities vis-à-vis other armed actors or the 
UN’s own personnel, but also against civilians. A key question is which military means (e.g. units, types of weapons, 
communication campaigns) are causing most of the violence against civilians. Denying the perpetrator access to these 
resources will have a protective effect. 
When the perpetrator is a government or government-sponsored actor, the units responsible for violence against  
civilians will usually be conventional or irregular forces coordinated from above:
•	 During	GENOCIDE	and	ETHNIC	CLEANSING,	the	units	conducting	the	killing	and	cleansing	operations	are	usually	 
 mobile and lightly armed special units or irregular forces, while conventional forces play a more supporting role  
 in terms of area control, logistical support and reducing risks. The irregular units usually have sufficient autonomy to  
 permit authorities to have plausible deniability.
•	 During	GOVERNMENT	REPRESSION,	conventional forces and heavy weaponry will play the main role in suppressing  
 both armed and unarmed resistance, due to the massive and indiscriminate firepower required to crush all  
 opposition. In authoritarian regimes, the best equipped and trained, most loyal and reliable military units are often  
 dedicated solely to the protection of the regime from internal threats. Irregular forces usually play a supporting role  
 as particularly loyal troops and force multipliers. They also serve to minimize risks for the conventional forces in  
 urban areas.
When the perpetrators are organized armed groups, most killings are committed by regular members of these groups. 
In addition, particular types of tactics or weapons are used:
•	 During	POST-CONFLICT	REVENGE,	COMMUNAL	CONFLICT	and	PREDATORY	VIOLENCE,	the	primary	perpetrators	of	 
 violence against civilians are individuals or members of organized armed groups who kill, plunder, destroy, brutalize  
 or abduct civilians.
•	 During	INSURGENCY,	the	principal	causes	of	civilian	death	may	be	the manner in which insurgents operate  
 (civilians as human shields, firing into crowds) or the indiscriminate types of weapons used (e.g. mortar fire, IEDs or  
 suicide attacks).
Media control (e.g. state TV, radio or internet) enables perpetrators to mobilize support for violence, e.g. by spreading 
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hate messages or threats online. However, media may also be exploited by intervening forces to encourage defection 
among perpetrators, to counter radicalization of moderates and to reduce the perception of insecurity in situations 
where fear itself is a key driver of violence (COMMUNAL CONFLICT). Finally, the perpetrator’s type of leadership (e.g. 
the degree of support from the armed forces and previous record of violence against civilians) and existing ethnic or 
sectarian fault lines within military ranks are also likely to influence their willingness to target civilians.
Civilians: What are the civilian coping strategies? 
Civilian behavior may also influence the nature of the threat. Every person under threat follows his or her individual 
coping strategy, but, in general, individuals and groups usually follow one of three coping strategies: they flee, resist, 
or co-exist with, the perpetrators. Fleeing is most common in the most violent scenarios. Although fleeing saves many 
lives, it makes refugees/IDPs very vulnerable to other types of harm. 
For civilian protection practitioners and military forces, protecting those on the run is very challenging. The causes and 
patterns of flight will, however, vary and should be taken into account:
•	 Civilians	are	likely	to	flee	the presence of particular perpetrators in those scenarios where they are primary targets,  
 e.g. on the basis of group identity (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, COMMUNAL CONFLICT), affiliation with a  
 previous perpetrator (POST-CONFLICT REVENGE), or because they are easy targets (PREDATORY VIOLENCE). In these  
 cases, even rumors of a perpetrator’s presence may prompt many to flee.
•	 In	scenarios	where	specific	groups	of	civilians	are	not	as	deliberately	targeted	(GOVERNMENT	REPRESSION,	 
 INSURGENCY), but where the main targets for both sides are enemy combatants, civilians primarily flee the  
 presence of fighting rather than the presence of one or another actor.
A key is to understand to where civilians are fleeing. Civilians often have very context-specific coping strategies, based 
on the available alternatives. In general, many people on the run tend to flee towards cities or towns, which can lead to 
multiplying population sizes in urban areas. Civilians are also likely to expect military forces to protect them by virtue 
of their presence. Consequently, military bases, including UN peace operation bases, often attract large numbers of 
IDPs. Both cities and camps may offer sorely needed resources such as medicine, water, food and so forth. Alternatively, 
civilians may disperse into the bush, which is common in parts of Africa. 
In some cases, the civilian population will co-exist with the perpetrators. As long as they are not targeted on the basis 
of their identity, political affiliation or affiliation with previous perpetrators, it can make more sense to seek security 
and survival by finding ways to get by in the presence of potential perpetrators. 
•	 Co-existence	is	most	common	in	MOB	VIOLENCE,	POST-CONFLICT	REVENGE	and	INSURGENCY.	In	the	two	first	 
 scenarios, the threat level is quite low (as long as civilians do not have a particularly strong connection with former  
 perpetrators or find themselves at the center of the attention of a violent mob). In INSURGENCY, however, the threat  
 level will often fluctuate according to who is controlling the area. The threat level increases significantly when one  
 party loses control and another moves in. 
•	 Some	predatory	actors	will	choose	to	live	among	the	people	they	prey	on,	and,	as	such,	may	force	potential	victims	 
 to co-exist with them. Most predatory actors, however, stay away from communities and incite fear and flight  
 among civilian populations in their vicinity.
•	 Co-existence	is	very	unlikely	in	GENOCIDE,	ETHNIC	CLEANISNG,	GOVERNMENT	REPRESSION	and	COMMUNAL	 
 CONFLICT.
Civilian expectations of how the UN forces will protect them (or not) should influence the troops’ responses. Ideally, 
UN forces should communicate to the civilian population what they can/will do, and make preparations to fulfill the 
expectations, or explain why they cannot do so. For example, some civilians might expect protection at a UN base, or 
that the UN mission together with the humanitarian community will be able to deliver assistance to their new location. 
Some might expect that the mission will not upset the compromise they have struck with the perpetrator or disturb 
the balance of power in the area by conducting military operations that change the armed actor’s calculation about 
how to interact with the civilian population. Finally, some might even expect that UN troops will arm them or conduct 
joint operations together with them.  
The spread of information technology has facilitated victim documentation of war crimes. However, a potential danger 
is that the rapid dissemination of information may cause violence to spread more quickly as conflict in one area may 
trigger conflicts along similar ethnic, sectarian or tribal lines elsewhere (e.g. how COMMUNAL CONFLICT broke out in 
numerous locations within days during the start of the crisis in South Sudan in late 2013/early 2014). The result may be 
a faster escalation of violence against civilians in future conflicts. There is therefore a need to be prepared to protect – 
including in missions that are not explicitly mandated to protect civilians in the first place.
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Example of threat analysis
To help visualize the analysis of different threats, a fictional map is provided below, placing three different  
scenarios in different areas. Color coding can be utilized to indicate which threat is most dangerous and/or most 
likely to civilian security. In the example provided in the map, three different scenarios have been plotted and given 
different colors (green = least dangerous, orange = medium threat, red = most dangerous). 
Empirical studies have shown that COMMUNAL CONFLICT, PREDATORY VIOLENCE and INSURGENCY have been  
the three most common scenarios in UN peace operations during the past 15 years. All three scenarios have been  
identified within the same mission in the example below. Insurgents are relatively limited in their violence against  
civilians as long as they only seek to undermine the control of other actors, so INSURGENCY is considered the least 
dangerous situation for civilians. Both predatory actors and communal militias can be very deadly and displace  
huge numbers of civilians. However, when whole communities engage in large-scale attacks, the scenario is one  
of the most deadly and is therefore considered the greatest threat to civilians. COMMUNAL CONFLICT is therefore  
considered the most dangerous and PREDATORY VIOLENCE the medium threat. Keep in mind that these are just  
examples. Context-specific conditions may lead to particularly brutal insurgencies or communal conflicts that are 
quite limited in terms of violence against civilians. 
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3.3 Early warning indicators
In this section, a list of early warning indicators is provided for each scenario in Table 3.1. 
Early warning indicators can be used to identify situations that may unfold, but have not yet fully developed. As UN 
peace operations are considered to be most effective in the early phases of a conflict – when prevention is still an  
option – early warning indicators may be very valuable to facilitate a timely response and to provide a better  
understanding of when one scenario is shifting towards the next. 
Table 3.1      Early warning indicators for each scenario
Scenario Early warning indicators
Mob violence •	Civilian	crowds	rioting
•	Allegations	that	may	trigger	large-scale	riots,	e.g.	rumors	of	abductions,	ritual	killings
•	Perception	among	demobilized	soldiers	or	former	militias	of	being	treated	unfairly
•	Small-scale	skirmishes	prior	to	elections	and/or	major	political	events
•	Planned	demonstrations	(can	get	out	of	hand)
Post-conflict 
revenge
•	Recent	history	of	violence	against	civilians,	which	has	created	a	desire	for	revenge
•	Turn	of	events	in	which	former	perpetrators	are	dramatically	weakened,	overthrown	or	have	 
  capitulated
•	Weak	state	capacities	unable	to	ensure	even	a	basic	level	of	security	from	criminal	violence
•	Rise	in	criminal	acts	of	violence	(e.g.	murder,	arson,	looting,	kidnapping)
•	Communal	or	political	groups	associated	with	former	perpetrators	targeted	in	particular
Insurgency •	Presence	of	armed	actors	with	clear	political	objectives
•	Civilians	targeted	on	the	basis	of	political	affiliation	with	government	or	rival	armed	groups	
•	Expressed	justification	for	targeting	individuals	or	groups	of	people	who	are	legally	defined	as	 
  civilians (e.g. government officials, governors, police forces who do not partake in military  
  operations)
•	Indiscriminate	attacks	in	populated	areas	against	politically	symbolic	or	militarily	important	 
  areas
•	Peaks	in	violence	against	civilians	in	retribution	for	perceived	collaboration	with	the	government	 
  or rival groups
Predatory  
violence
•	Presence	of	armed	groups	without	clear	political	objectives	or	rogue	government	forces
•	Host-nation	largely	unable	to	prevent	criminal	exploitation	of	civilians
•	Culture	of	impunity	and	history	of	violence 
•	Armed	groups	operating	with	seemingly	unobtainable	objectives,	but	refusing	to	disarm
•	Host-nation	armed	forces	lack	logistical	support	and	finances	to	feed	and	pay	own	troops
•	Lack	of	popular	support	or	alienated	population	in	areas	where	perpetrators	operate
•	Use	of	excessive	violence,	far	beyond	what	is	required	to	kill,	harm	or	instill	fear	in	the	population	 
  (mutilation, torture)
•	No	clear	geographical	patterns	in	terms	of	where	attacks	take	place,	other	than	in	areas	where	 
  potential rewards are high and resistance low
•	Particular	targeting	of		‘soft’		targets,	such	as	humanitarian	personnel	and	civilians,	rather	than	 
  military 
Communal 
conflict
•	Rising	tensions	over	access	to	land,	water,	cattle	or	other	means	of	survival
•	Escalating	cycles	of	revenge	attacks	beyond	‘normal’	patterns	of	raids,	etc.	
•	Civilians	targeted	on	basis	of	their	communal	identity,	as	opposed	to	targeted	completely	at	 
  random or primarily on basis of political affiliation
•	Relatively	even	balance	of	power	between	communities	in	terms	of	armed	strength
•	Rising	perceptions	of	an	existential	threat	from	the	other	community
•	Own	acts	of	violence	perceived	and	portrayed	as	necessary	for	self-defense
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Scenario Early warning indicators
•	Possible	declarations	of	intent	to	exterminate	or	expel	the	other	community	as	the	only	viable	 
  solution to defend themselves
•	Occasional	attacks	which	are	as	destructive	as	possible	(e.g.	killing	rather	than	capturing	people,	 
  destroying homes and means of survival, targeting the most populated urban locations with  
  indiscriminate bombs)
Government  
repression
•	Rising	political	pressure	on	the	government	in	power
•	The	government	perceives	an	increasing	threat	to	its	own	survival
•	Increased	violent	targeting	of	individuals	perceived	to	be	in	opposition	to	the	government	and	 
  civilians in general
•	Armed	opposition	groups	emerging	and/or	military	personnel	defecting
•	Gradually	more	indiscriminate	attacks	in	populated	areas	where	support	for	the	opposition	is	 
  perceived to be strong
•	In	mixed	societies,	communal	identity	may	increasingly	be	used	as	proxy	for	targeting	political	 
  opposition
Ethnic  
cleansing
•	Relative	military	superiority	of	one	ethnic,	tribal,	sectarian,	national	or	racial	community	in	 
  potential conflict areas
•	Rising	number	of	ambiguous	statements	about	having	to	expel	a	certain	community	from	 
  political and military leadership, seeking to inflame violence against other communal group,  
  while avoiding outside interference
•	Indications	of	preparations	to	permanently	displace	a	certain	population	(e.g.	by	seizing	political	 
  power in areas where the targeted community is present, or preparing documents requiring the  
  targeted population to relinquish entitlement to their homes)
•	Increased	perception	of	threat	amongst	minority	populations
•	Centralization	of	power	in	the	hands	of	nationalistic	or	extremist	political	and	military	leadership
•	Rising	levels	of	violence	in	areas	where	balance	of	power	between	communities	is	relatively	 
  even, in border areas with the perpetrator’s ethnic brethren, and in enclaves in which the  
  majority of civilians belong to the targeted community
•	Particularly	excessive	acts	of	violence	intended	to	make	people	flee,	as	opposed	to	 
  non-communicative or disguised acts aimed at killing as many as possible before they escape  
  (which could be early warning of GENOCIDE)
•	Increased	arming,	support	and	incorporation	of	paramilitaries,	militias	or	special	units	by	government		 
  authorities
•	One-sided	disarmament	causing	uneven	balance	between	communities	in	conflict
Genocide •	Gradual	congregation	of	potential	victims	in	certain	locations	(e.g.	organized	or	as	a	result	of	 
  threats or rumors)
•	Rising	perception	of	threats	among	civilians	from	a	certain	communal	group	across	the	entire	 
  area of operation
•	Alternative	solutions	(e.g.	expelling	or	controlling	a	population)	increasingly	seen	as	unfeasible	 
  from the perpetrator’s perspective
•	Dehumanization	of	the	targeted	group	of	civilians
•	Increased	mobilization	and	arming	of	paramilitaries,	militias	or	special	units	by	state	authorities
•	Political	and	military	leadership	securing	greater	control	over	armed	forces	and	the	security	 
  services
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4  Military planning
User guide
This chapter provides advice to military planners at the strategic and operational levels on how military force can be 
used to protect civilians in different situations. The following insights may be useful to consider during the mission 
analysis phase of a military planning process, where the focus shifts from analyzing threats to civilians towards how 
the threats may be addressed. 
The biggest challenge for military planners lies in understanding when to do what. Thus, the chapter describes the 
role of the military component in providing physical protection for civilians and suggests potential courses of action 
in each specific scenario. 
Understanding the role of military force. One purpose of this document is to provide a better understanding of 
the role of military forces within the whole-of-mission approach to the protection of civilians in UN peace operations. 
Understanding what the military component can and cannot do to protect civilians in different situations (scenarios) 
can help improve the planning and sequencing of and preparations for military, civilian and political efforts, based on 
what is likely to be required in order to protect civilians from various types of threats. The eight POC scenarios provide 
insights relevant to assessing the role and utility of military force and potential military courses of action.
This document focuses on the effects of the perpetrator’s actions on civilian security, not on how the perpetrator might 
aim its capabilities towards the UN mission. Yet, this latter aspect is also an important part of the analysis, not least 
because such developments may in turn have negative effects on civilian security. 
The UN’s approach. According to UN policies, the range of multidimensional UN POC instruments fall into three  
distinct tiers that are mutually accommodating and reinforcing, and should be implemented simultaneously  
(see POC Policy, 2015):
•	 Tier	I:	 Protection	through	dialogue	and	engagement
•	 Tier	II:	 Provision	of	physical	protection
•	 Tier	III:	Establishment	of	a	protective	environment
There is no inherent hierarchy or sequencing among the tiers, and action under all three tiers should emphasize 
prevention and pre-emption, as well as the primacy of the host-state’s responsibility to protect civilians. All mission 
components have a role to play in each of the tiers. However, the military component has the primary responsibility 
within Tier II.
Utility of the UN military component. UN infantry battalions have often been considered the main providers of 
physical protection to civilians. The threat-based approach applies a broader understanding of the potential of military 
force to protect. Protection can best be provided through utilizing the capabilities of all military units and personnel in 
a mission. This includes capabilities under tasking authority of other than the Force Commander, such as supply units 
and enablers. This may include, but is not limited to, engineers, signals, supply units, ground transportation, military 
police, medical facilities, air transportation, aviation combat, fire support, intelligence assets, military geography, public 
affairs/outreach and maritime/riverine units. 
In some situations, employing military force may be required to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence 
against civilians. The primary question is not whether to use more or less force, but how that force is used against  
specific types of threats. Based on previous cases in which force has successfully been used to protect civilians,  
deterrence and coercion are the two most relevant functions of force. Military forces may be deployed to deter  
violence by threatening the use of force against the perpetrator. When force is actually applied, it is used to coerce  
a perpetrator into changing his behavior. 
Other essential capabilities and components. There is also a range of other resources and units essential to UN 
efforts to protect, such as mission support, logistics, civil affairs, JMACs, early warning mechanisms, JOCs, lessons 
learned units and so forth. There is still untapped potential in combining these capabilities in a more concerted  
manner to increase the utility of military force to protect. 
Similarly, strategic communication may be used to trigger preventive and pre-emptive POC effects by influencing  
a target audience or through strategic messaging to perpetrators of violence, host-state actors and the civilian  
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population under threat. Strategic communication may include pro-active use of social media and networking plat-
forms, imagery, videos and other mechanisms with the power to influence perception. In fact, all actions conducted 
by the military component should have an element of strategic communication. For example, a strong force posture is 
strategic messaging with the clear intention of achieving a POC effect, without having to employ lethal force. This  
document does not provide a blueprint for how to optimize strategic communication in UN peace operations in  
general. It rather considers the use of strategic communication in some of the scenarios for the specific purpose of 
protecting civilians. 
Key questions. The purpose of mission analysis is to consider aspects that may impact all mission components. POC is 
the shared responsibility of many actors both within and outside the UN’s structure. In UN peace operations, planning 
is typically performed in integrated planning teams, representing all substantial actors involved in POC. The mission 
analysis will include all aspects related to the particular mission’s POC tasks, ranging from the specific mandate, to  
policies, strategies, guidelines and concepts. The development of courses of action focuses on how the military  
component can utilize its assets in response to specific threats within this framework. This chapter highlights two key 
questions essential for understanding how the military component can be used more effectively in conjunction with 
other components.
 What is the potential role and utility of military force to protect civilians? What can and cannot the military  
 component do to protect in different situations? Under what conditions should the military component assume  
 leading vs. supporting roles in providing protection? What other UN components must support or be supported by  
 the military component in different situations?
 How can military force be more targeted towards protection in particular situations? Which courses of action  
 will reduce the threat to civilians most effectively? Which courses of action may inadvertently increase the threat to  
 civilians? What is the perpetrator’s most likely coursea of action against civilians? What is the most dangerous  
 perpetrator coursea of action against civilians? What are the risks to UN personnel?
Below follow suggestions on how these questions may be answered in each scenario.
4.1 Mob violence
The role of military force. Dealing with mob violence is first of all a policing task, but military UN forces may be the  
only units available. Military forces are generally not trained for law enforcement tasks, but this scenario can challenge  
the existing capabilities of the host-nation’s security forces/UN police. Therefore, UN military troops must be prepared  
to assist local/UN police forces. Military units deploying into urban environments to prevent, deter or counter mob  
violence should therefore be trained and equipped for riot handling. Consider establishing riot-handling-capable 
Quick Reaction Forces in support of UN police (FPU) operations. As a last resort, military force may have to be used 
to contain and disperse violent rioting crowds. The military component’s contribution to reducing freedom of move-
ment may include the construction of physical barriers to deny access to vulnerable groups. Ability to apply non-lethal 
means is particularly relevant. Command and control arrangements to enable interaction with external units should be 
considered and reflected in framework documents such as Concepts of Operations. Detention policies are among the 
topics that require clarity for the military component.
Possible courses of action. Courses of action could include deterring, controlling and dispersing crowds, preferably 
through non-lethal means and always in compliance with gradual use of force. While this scenario may become the 
sole responsibility of military UN forces, close cooperation with police forces is essential. Key infrastructure/locations/
buildings must be defended, as there is potential for significant material damage to civilian property. The first  
echelon in dealing with rioting individuals or crowds should be police forces. Lack of ability or capabilities from local 
law enforcement authorities or UN police units must not lead to inaction by the military component. However, if  
military force is used, close cooperation with UN police and/or with local authorities must be ensured. Employing a 
gradual response when countering mob violence is of utmost importance, as a military response with the application 
of basic military principles may escalate a situation and spark increased violence. Finally, robust deployment of  
military forces, first and foremost through a show of force, may be required to contain and control violent crowds 
(which themselves may be comprised of civilians) when civilians are threatened. Any orders must provide clear  
instructions on Rules of Engagement, as military forces are generally ill suited for civilian law enforcement.  
If coordinated with local authorities, apprehension of suspects must comply with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence 
Policy and the DPKO/DFS Interim Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) on Detention in UN Peace Operations. All actors 
involved must know the SOPs and regulations that apply to the apprehension and detention of perpetrators, which is 
especially likely in this scenario (as in POST-CONFLICT REVENGE).
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4.2 Post-conflict revenge
The role of military force. Similar to mob-violence, post-conflict revenge is mainly a policing task, but UN troops may  
be the only units available to deter attacks against civilians in this scenario. If post-conflict revenge violence is left 
unaddressed, it may continue until most scores are settled or all potential targets have fled. Revenge killings may also 
create a new score to be settled. The opportunistic and individual nature of attacks makes early warning difficult, and 
the role of the military may become mostly reactive, assisting civilian authorities in arresting alleged perpetrators. 
Close cooperation with local networks will therefore be a critical precondition for successful prevention. Military units 
conducting operations aimed at countering or pre-empting post-conflict revenge should be given scenario-specific 
training in law enforcement situations to avoid excessive use of force. If potential victims are congregated in particular 
quarters/enclaves/camps and so forth – a strong deterrent posture will be needed.
Possible courses of action. Locations where potential victims reside must be defended. Military presence may deter 
perpetrators from attacking at a particular moment, but it is unlikely that the desire to settle scores can be deflected 
altogether. Most importantly, the military component must be prepared for large-scale attacks that include more  
organized avenging groups, as this may lead to massive displacement and a de facto separation of former warring 
communities. Cooperation with police forces is essential at all stages of the operations, regardless of which course of 
action is chosen. A high state of readiness and an ability to respond quickly when these situations occur will be  
decisive to protect those threatened. Traffic control posts between or around opposing groups likely to be attacked  
or attack can be a useful measure. 
Perpetrators are critically dependent on freedom of movement to reach their intended targets. Widespread military 
and/or police presence will therefore be useful to deny opportunities to settle personal scores. Pre-empting these  
attacks is virtually impossible, as long as they consist of individual criminal behavior. Active use of strategic  
communication, through radio broadcasts, public information, visible military presence and outreach to populations, 
can be effective force multipliers and achieve deterrent and preventive effects on potential perpetrators. Night patrols 
may have a reassuring effect on the population, in both urban and rural areas. They may have an equally deterrent  
effect on possible perpetrators. Any orders must provide clear instructions on Rules of Engagement, as military forces 
are generally ill suited for civilian law enforcement. If coordinated with local authorities, apprehension of suspects 
must comply with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and the DPKO/DFS Interim Standing Operating Procedure 
(SOP) on Detention in UN Peace Operations. All actors involved must know the SOPs and regulations that apply to the 
apprehension and detention of perpetrators, which is especially likely in this scenario (as in MOB VIOLENCE).
4.3 Insurgency
The role of military force. In this scenario, the role of military force in protecting civilians from physical violence will  
be limited. In fact, physical safety is unlikely to be the primary concern for the majority of civilians, since the threat of 
violence is usually relatively low and selective. Military forces must at minimum be able to hold and control areas that 
are wrested from insurgent control until local security forces can establish a presence more permanently. If control is not 
feasible, clearing insurgent strongholds will only increase the threat to civilians, as retaliation against perceived  
collaborators is likely to occur if the area is recaptured by insurgents. UN military efforts to protect in this scenario 
should be distinguished from counter-insurgency efforts, usually undertaken by other actors. 
Possible courses of action. Cooperation with government troops may provide valuable information on the  
perpetrators. This will also increase the risk of being perceived as partial in the conflict. As a result, insurgents might 
also target the military component and/or the UN mission at large. Beyond defending key population centers from 
insurgents, monitoring government forces in these same areas may be important to reduce risks of retaliation against 
civilians on the basis of perceived or real affiliation with insurgents. The chosen course of action should distinguish  
between actions that are aimed at protecting civilians from being directly targeted, and efforts to mitigate harm  
during operations against the insurgents (collateral damage). Strategic communication may be used to increase  
awareness among the population of how insurgents deliberately target civilians and how the mission attempts to 
protect civilians from this violence.
4.4 Predatory violence
The role of military force. The role of the military component is likely to be important in cases of predatory violence. 
Offensive military operations may be the only way of providing more permanent protection from perpetrators preying 
on the population. Temporary protection may be improved through dispersed presence and deterrence, as predatory 
actors are usually easily deterred by professional military forces. Failed attempts to defeat predatory rebel groups  
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may, however, backfire on the civilian population rather than on the military forces and generate more violence than  
if the armed actors had not been confronted in the first place. Members of militias and criminal gangs often include  
abducted young adolescents and children, both male and female – which makes ethical challenges particularly likely 
and acute when confronting perpetrators in this scenario. It is always necessary to consult Mission child protection 
actors in a timely manner if child soldiers/young abductees are present. The psychological effects of brutal perpetrator 
tactics may have an impact on the morale of UN troops and should be addressed as part of the training of all units. 
Possible courses of action. Military presence may deter local attacks, but UN troops cannot protect everyone at all 
times. Predatory actors will most likely adapt to the operating pattern of the military component by attacking civilians 
in areas with no UN presence. Hence, a direct approach towards these perpetrators may become inevitable.  
Disarmament programs may be helpful to convince the rank and file to defect and demobilize. Strategic communication 
to encourage defections has worked in the past. Predatory violence may generate a high number of displaced civilians, 
with an increased need for physical protection compared to when they are in the areas in which they usually reside. 
This may tie down UN troops to static protection while the rebels continue to mount attacks in areas which have no 
military presence. Defeating predatory actors will most certainly create the need for deploying troops to newly seized 
areas on a semi-permanent basis, until some kind of state authority is established. Leaving areas where predatory rebel 
groups have been defeated may see the reoccurrence of new groups with even more hard-hitting tactics towards the 
local population. The UN Force may be well placed to provide initial area security to increase the level of protection 
for civilians. Cooperation with national security forces may be complicated by the fact that certain units may also be 
directly involved in the predatory violence, or collaborating with the armed groups. As such, always refer to the  
UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Close interaction and cooperation with local communities to ensure early  
warning, combined with high readiness and mobility to reach out to population centers at risk, may have a deterrent 
effect on some perpetrators. 
4.5 Communal conflict
The role of military force. Left to its own escalatory dynamics, communal conflict has the potential for sudden peaks  
in violence, with a high number of deaths relative to population. Military force may have a decisive role to play in  
protecting either community in the short to intermediate term. Military presence may have a positive deterrent effect, 
but will not be able to solve the dynamics driving the cycles of revenge/defense. The presence of small arms among 
previously primitively armed communities in conflict dramatically increases the deadliness of this scenario.  
As such, parallel disarmament and demobilization of all communities involved may be the only long-term solution  
to improving civilian security. However, disarmament in itself will not address the underlying motivations for  
communities to arm themselves in the first place. Direct dialogue and engagement of the key leaders can be  
effective, but may also be perceived as being partial, and is often better undertaken by e.g. Civil Affairs than the UN 
Force. Cross-component cooperation is essential, and any such approach must be justified through active engagement 
(strategic communication) with relevant target audiences. 
Possible courses of action. Both sides, including their means of survival, must be defended from imminent large-scale 
attacks. Warring parties could be physically separated, although this may create the unintended long-term  
consequences of a de facto partitioning of a population. Maintaining a military presence among and between the 
affected communities may discourage attacks, but will not remove the threat permanently. Cooperating with one of 
the parties may be perceived as taking sides. As such, inter-positioning may therefore be the most effective approach. 
However, limiting the freedom of movement of potential perpetrators may generate undesired effects on trade, access 
to schools and so forth. Technical arrangements should be made to reduce such unintended consequences. Breaking 
the cycle of violence by disarming one of the parties first, is likely to leave one community more vulnerable to attack. 
This will enable the other community to escalate violence into ETHNIC CLEANSING or even acts of GENOCIDE. As such, 
militias and armed civilians from both sides must be disarmed simultaneously. 
4.6 Government repression
The role of military force. This scenario involves situations that might require responses that fall outside the UN’s  
capabilities. Government repression usually involves violations committed by the host-nation government.  
However, UN troops may still be deployed when such a scenario develops. In that case, a UN military presence can  
limit the government’s ability or willingness to use heavy weapons against its own population, which is often a primary 
cause of civilian casualties in this scenario. 
Possible courses of action. Areas of strong civilian opposition support and elites should be defended and the  
government’s ability to crush its own population must be reduced. As such, any effort that may hinder or reduce the 
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perpetrator’s access to heavy weapons will have effect. Doing so, however, may jeopardize the consent of the host-
state, and lead to early exit of the UN operation. A highly visible UN military presence in protection hot spots may deter 
attacks, although this approach may significantly increase the risk to the UN personnel involved and attacks may just 
shift elsewhere. Offensive capabilities (special forces, attack helicopters, etc.) may be utilized to directly target assets 
that are being used to attack populated areas, but, again, this is a highly risky approach for most UN missions. 
4.7 Ethnic cleansing
The role of military force. This scenario also involves situations requiring military responses that fall outside the UN’s 
capabilities. Nonetheless, UN missions have previously been deployed to conflicts where ethnic cleansing is ongoing. 
As such, the military component may play a decisive role, but confronting the units conducting the violence will often be 
required to reduce the threat to civilians. More strategic use of violence may also be required against traditional military 
targets to influence the calculus of the perpetrators and force them to abandon ethnic cleansing as a strategy. Here,  
regional organizations may be the most relevant actors. Since civilians will be targeted on the basis of ethnicity, 
in-depth knowledge about communities and the human terrain is of utmost importance to guide when and where 
military action will be most useful. 
Possible courses of action. Locations or larger geographical areas in which potential victims are gathered must be  
defended. The hot spots are likely to be where new territory has been recently seized, and in minority enclaves,  
corridors or pockets that link the perpetrating actor’s ethnic areas together. Protecting masses of civilians on the run  
or in IDP/refugee camps must be done in close cooperation with the humanitarian actors present. In extreme cases, 
the most vulnerable victims might have to be escorted out of an area until the threat subsides, although this in practice 
assists the aim of the perpetrators. The perpetrators may be militarily coerced into abandoning ethnic cleansing as a 
strategy if their military superiority and territorial control is challenged. However, regional organizations, coalitions, or 
militarily strong actors are the only actors capable of performing military operations on this scale.
4.8 Genocide
The role of military force. In this scenario, the role of military forces is likely to be decisive in protecting civilians.  
However, genocide involves situations that most often will demand responses that fall outside the UN’s capabilities, 
due to the sheer scale of the violence. Yet, UN peace operations have previously been deployed in this scenario  
(Rwanda), including in situations in which acts of genocides have been committed (such as in Srebrenica in Bosnia). 
The military component may play a particularly important role in protecting key locations where many potential  
targets are congregated, although this is not going to reduce the threat to civilians elsewhere. In previous cases,  
genocidal perpetrators have not stopped killing until they have been defeated or achieved their strategic aim. 
Possible courses of action. An emerging genocide is likely to require agile military responses, strategic expeditionary 
mobility and war-fighting capabilities to match perpetrators at the strategic level. Regional organizations or militarily 
strong countries are the only ones capable of applying force at this level. Short of confronting the perpetrators on the 
ground, UN troops can help facilitate the evacuation of civilians and limit suffering by reducing their vulnerabilities.  
Defending areas or sites where many are congregated is likely to save many lives. UN military forces may also reduce 
the killings by disrupting the freedom of movement and access to weapons for perpetrators on the ground. Since this  
scenario is characterized by the fact that all civilians belonging to the target group are potential victims, it is necessary 
to prioritize protection efforts in areas where civilians are congregated in large numbers and the most lives can be 
saved.
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5 Tactical responses
User guide
This chapter provides a list of possible tactical responses in particular scenarios, structured according to the UN’s  
four response phases. The main audiences are battalion, task force and company commanders in-mission with the 
task of responding to a particular situation.
At the tactical level in UN peace operations, physical protection may be provided during four different phases:  
(i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) response and (iv) consolidation, with a view to either eliminating a threat or  
mitigating the risks to civilians associated with it (see POC Policy, 2015). 
Table 5.1     The UN’s POC response phases
These phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently. 
Activities and objectives mentioned under these phases will vary along with the specific content of each country- 
specific mandate and the nature of each threat. A list of potential responses and potential challenges and pitfalls  
during each of these phases follows for each scenario.
Response phases Activities
Phase 1: Prevention  
(threat is latent)
These activities shall be conducted in areas where no clear threat to civilians has yet been 
identified.
Phase 2: Pre-emption  
(threat is identified)
When likely threats are identified and attacks against civilians are anticipated, pro-active 
measures are required to mitigate or eliminate them before violence occurs. This requires 
deterring a party or person(s) from committing hostile acts, or affecting their capacity 
to do so, including through the use of force. Activities under the prevention phase will 
continue to be implemented, particularly in areas under threat.
Phase 3: Response  
(threat is identified)
Whenever physical violence against civilians is apparent, missions will aim immediately 
at stopping aggressors from conducting hostile acts through political, security or legal 
means.
Phase 4: Consolidation  
(threat has been  
mitigated/eliminated)
When violence against civilians is subsiding, the mission will support the progressive  
return to stability and normalcy. These activities will be conducted as required in support 
of or in close coordination with host-state authorities and the UN Country Team and 
other partners.
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5.1 Mob violence
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	Direct	dialogue	with	key	leaders
•	Military	presence	and	deterrent	patrolling	 
  to prevent mobs from gathering, growing  
  and moving
•	Strategic	communication
•	Key	leaders	hard	to	identify
•	Difficult	access	to	key	leaders
•	Lack	of	legitimacy	among	population
Pre-emption •	Contain	and	control	crowds
•	Large	number	of	troops	to	display	military	 
  power without the employment of deadly  
  force
•	Strategic	communication
•	Pre-emption	through	the	use	of	force	may	 
  spark further violence
Response •	Use	enabling	capabilities	to	restrict	 
  movement, to establish barricades, and to  
  funnel and control people and traffic
•	Disrupt	the	formation	of	crowds	by	 
  establishing separation zones
•	Patrolling
•	Use	relevant	capabilities	in	the	military	 
  component such as engineering  
  companies, fire-fighting equipment, and  
  containers
•	Military	forces	often	poorly	trained	and	 
  equipped for handling mob violence
•	Military	force	very	often	too	blunt	to	 
  respond to law and order challenges
•	Detention	policy	may	hinder	apprehension	 
  by UN troops
Consolidation •	Transfer	responsibility	to	civilian	police	as	 
  soon as possible
•	Deterrent	patrolling	and	military	presence	 
  to increase the sense of assurance and  
  security in the aftermath
•	Strategic	communication
•	Increased	military	presence	may	also	 
  increase a sense of insecurity
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5.2 Post-conflict revenge
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	Establishing	and	maintaining	own	forces’	 
  freedom of movement in areas most  
  affected by violence might restrict the  
  freedom of movement for perpetrators 
•	Presence	in	areas	where	likely	targets	 
  congregate may deter violence
•	Primarily	the	responsibility	of	law	 
  enforcement agencies
•	Military	component	probably	not	able	to	 
  protect particular individuals, as they   
  might be targeted whenever the  
  opportunity arises
Pre-emption •	Once	a	threat	has	been	identified,	a		
  pre-emptive effect may be achieved 
  through apprehending instigators of  
  violence
•	Assuring	the	populace	in	areas	affiliated	 
  with previous perpetrators (through  
  presence) may reduce the likelihood of  
  large-scale displacement 
•	Pre-positioning	of	troops	and	military	 
  assets in high-risk areas may deter attacks 
•	A	coordinated,	early	approach	could	 
  pre-empt the situation from escalating into 
  more organized violence
•	Military	presence	may	raise	the	 
  expectations of a genuine ability to  
  protect or deter attacks 
•	All	efforts	to	protect	through	force	must	be	 
  done in close cooperation with UN Police  
  and FPUs
•	Legal/formal	framework	issues	on	joint	UN	 
  military/police operations
•	Individuals	may	still	be	targeted	despite	 
  successful efforts to stop escalation into  
  more violent scenario
Response •	Coercive	military	responses	against	 
  particular serious incidents could have a  
  preventive effect in the future
•	Protected	areas	may	be	provided	as	a	last	 
  resort to groups of civilians who feel  
  particularly threatened
•	Any	response	is	likely	to	be	reactive	
•	Military	responses	may	risk	jeopardizing	 
  the consent of the host-state government 
•	POC	areas	will	demand	commitment	to	the	 
  highest degree of safety and security, such  
  as 24/7 close access control, internal  
  control, disarmament of residents etc.
Consolidation •	Transfer	responsibility	to	civilian	police	 
  forces as soon as possible 
•	As	in	mob	violence,	the	role	of	the	 
  military component is quite limited
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5.3 Insurgency
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	Strategic	communication	can	be	used	as	a	 
  tool to set conditions for why and when  
  the UN will use force to protect 
•	The	military	component	may	provide	 
  indirect protection such as by removing  
  IEDs, mines, etc
•	Protecting	civilians	can	blur	the	lines	 
  between protection of civilians and  
  defeating the insurgents 
•	Attacking	insurgents	may	cause	 
  unnecessary harm to civilians  
  (revenge attacks/collateral damage)
•	The	UN	may	be	perceived	as	part	of	 
  the conflict 
•	Insurgent	strategy	to	undermine	 
  the government may be used  
  against the UN mission
•	Available	assets	and	resources	must	be	 
  used on self-protection measures
Pre-emption •	Search	operations	to	find	and	destroy	 
  explosive device production sites and  
  infrastructure supporting the insurgency  
  may pre-empt attacks on civilians
•	Any	pre-emptive	effort	demands	close	 
  cooperation with host-government troops 
Response •	It	is	critical	to	be	able	to	hold	areas	that	 
  have been cleared of insurgents
•	Physical	safety	is	unlikely	to	be	the	primary	 
  concern for the majority of civilians
•	Failure	to	hold	areas	increases	incentive	for	 
  insurgents to attack civilians 
Consolidation •	The	military	component	may	be	essential	 
  in (re)building host-state capability to  
  address its own security concerns 
•	Presence	through	patrolling	in	areas	under	 
  government control may increase  
  perception of stability
•	Insurgency	campaigns	may	last	decades	
•	Be	careful	in	pushing	local	populations	to	 
  take sides in areas that are contested
•	Perceived	cooperation	with	one	party	to	 
  the conflict may lead to retaliatory attacks,  
  including by host-nation security forces
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5.4 Predatory violence
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	A	decentralized	deployment	of	troops,	 
  with a posture demonstrating and  
  conveying willingness and ability to use  
  force, is likely to deter rebels from moving  
  freely
•	Strategic	communication	may	be	utilized	 
  to inspire fighters to demobilize
•	Pro-active	use	of	surveillance	assets	such	 
  as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles may have  
  preventive effects (on potential attacks)
•	Predatory	militias	or	criminal	gangs	will	 
  usually avoid confrontations with host- 
  nation forces and UN troops
•	Deterrent	presence	will	not	be	enough	to	 
  stop attacks against civilians 
•	If	faced	with	resistance,	these	perpetrators	 
  may simply move on to the next  
  undefended target
Pre-emption •	The	most	effective	role	of	the	military	 
  component will involve a pre-emptive,  
  direct approach to the perpetrators
•	Speed	and	mobility	is	critical	when	early- 
  warning indicators point to imminent  
  attacks
•	The	military	component	must	be	prepared	 
  to be faced with juveniles when  
  confronting such armed groups
Response •	Military	operations	into	areas	where	 
  attacks are ongoing will deter further  
  attacks in that area
•	Threat	is	highly	likely	to	move	elsewhere
Consolidation •	It	may	be	necessary	to	hold	areas	that	have	 
  been subject to attack to inspire civilians to 
  move back home 
•	The	extension	of	state	authority	into	areas	 
  troubled by predatory actors is crucial to  
  establish lasting protection
•	Predatory	attacks	often	generate	large- 
  scale civilian displacement
•	Host-government	security	forces	may	also	 
  display predatory behavior
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5.5 Communal conflict
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	Prolong	the	period	between	attacks 
  through deterrent presence/inter- 
  positioning/separation of the warring  
  parties
•	Dialogue	and	engagement	(e.g.	by	Civil	 
  Affairs) is essential in this phase.  
  Support for conflict prevention/mitigation/ 
  etc.
•	Communal	conflicts	in	urban	areas	are	 
  particularly challenging, as people may live 
  in mixed communities or only be separated 
  by roads and/or fences/walls
•	Difficult	to	address	the	drivers	of	conflict	 
  with military force
Pre-emption •	The	military	component	can	pre-empt	 
  large-scale attacks through deterrent  
  actions and, if needed, coercive action
•	The	role	of	attacker	and	victim	may	change	 
  within a matter of days
•	Perpetrators	are	driven	to	attack	both	to		 
  defend themselves and to avenge last  
  round of attack
Response •	Responding	with	both	mass	and	speed	 
  may be necessary, as larger scale attacks  
  may include thousands of fighters 
•	Applying	force	effectively	to	stop	ongoing	 
  attacks will be very challenging
•	UN	forces	responding	to	an	imminent	 
  threat may be perceived as partial in the  
  eyes of the opposing party
Consolidation •	To	reduce	the	perceived	threat	of	 
  insecurity among all parties, it will be  
  important to establish security structures  
  that balance the relative powers of the  
  communities involved
•	Disarmament	must	be	done	in	parallel	to	 
  avoid creating an imbalance of power  
  between communities
•	The	likelihood	is	that	these	conflicts	 
  linger on long after the exit of UN forces
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5.6 Government repression
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	Preventive	measures	in	this	scenario	are	 
  probably mostly found in Tier I  
  (protection through dialogue and  
  engagement) of the POC Policy
•	Military	forces	may	help	facilitate	secure	 
  venues for political dialogue between the  
  incumbent party and the political  
  opposition
•	Distributed	military	presence	may	also	 
  decrease the opportunities to crack down  
  on the opposition
•	The	use	of	military	forces	to	protect	 
  refugees and/or IDPs may be the only way  
  to provide physical protection to civilians
•	If	the	government	sees	violence	as	 
  necessary for its own survival, the UN  
  military presence will not be enough to  
  deter escalation
Pre-emption •	Any	pre-emptive	military	action	to	 
  confront such a government and the  
  military forces loyal to the leadership may  
  trigger attacks against UN forces
 
•	If	early-warning	indicators	point	towards	 
  this type of scenario, it may be possible to  
  decrease the government’s ability to attack  
  its own people by seizing control over  
  heavy weapons before consent is lost
•	Any	consent	from	the	host	nation		will	be	 
  very hesitant
Response •	Any	military	response	must	be	carefully	 
  orchestrated with all other UN efforts
•	Defensive	operations	aiming	to	protect	 
  civilians under attack from government  
  forces may have an effect
 
•	Carefully	planned	and	coordinated	use	of	 
  strategic communication may have  
  deterrent effects
•	Protecting	civilians	against	government	 
  repression through tactical response  
  operations may rapidly challenge the  
  bedrock principle of consent
Consolidation •	The	role	of	a	UN	military	component	may	 
  be significant in the aftermath of such  
  scenarios
•	Impartial	security	provision	and	rebuilding	 
  state security structures may be essential
•	The	trust	between	the	former	warring	 
  parties will be low
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5.7 Ethnic cleansing
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	Providing	hard	evidence	that	preparations	 
  for ethnic cleansing are actually being  
  undertaken, e.g. through monitoring and  
  reporting, is essential
•	The	perpetrator	may	be	coerced	into	 
  abandoning ethnic cleansing as a strategy  
  if the protector makes it too costly to  
  proceed
•	The	UN	will	often	be	ill-prepared	to	 
  respond effectively with force to ethnic  
  cleansing
•	It	may	be	difficult	to	legitimize	 
  preventative use of force before violence  
  has actually escalated and the scale of  
  violence does not need to be very high to  
  make people flee
Pre-emption •	Pre-emptive	military	measures	must	 
  primarily focus on confronting the units  
  responsible for the actual cleansing  
  (usually lightly armed, interior security or  
  paramilitary units)
•	Any	pre-emptive	response	may	trigger	 
  attacks on the UN mission to force its  
  withdrawal 
Response •	Perpetrators	must	be	directly	confronted	 
  before they have the ability to induce mass  
  flight
 
•	Show	of	force,	punitive	strikes,	and	 
  denying freedom of movement for  
  irregular and paramilitary units on the  
  ground will be most effective in protecting  
  civilians from the threat of expulsion 
 
•	Effective	responses	are	largely	beyond	 
  what the principles and capabilities of the  
  UN will allow for in terms of using force to  
  protect, but the military component can  
  play a supporting role alongside other  
  operations to protect
•	The	moment	people	flee,	the	perpetrators	 
  have already partly succeeded
 
•	The	actual	number	of	people	killed	may	 
  not be very high, but the number of  
  displaced will be huge
Consolidation •	UN	forces	can	have	a	significant	role	to	play	 
  in the aftermath of this scenario
•	Securing	the	orderly	return	of		refugees
•	POST-CONFLICT	REVENGE	or	reversed	 
  ethnic cleansing may occur in the  
  consolidation phase
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5.8 Genocide
Response phases Potential responses Potential challenges and pitfalls
Prevention •	In	the	early	preparatory	phases	of	 
  genocide, UN forces may be present and  
  be able to reduce the threat to civilians
•	Preventive	measures	may	include	 
  distributed presence to deter escalation  
  and defend against actual attacks in areas  
  where many of the targeted civilians live or  
  congregate (airports, stadiums, or public  
  buildings)
•	This	scenario	will	always	include	a	state	or	 
  state-like perpetrator, which means that  
  the UN will struggle to maintain consent
Pre-emption •	The	greatest	protection	effect	will	be	 
  achieved by seizing weapons caches or  
  denying freedom of movement so that the  
  perpetrators are not able to achieve high  
  killing rates 
•	UN	forces	could	conduct	pre-emptive	 
  operations to deter mass killings, as they  
  are likely to protect many, even though it  
  may only be a small portion of the total  
  number of victims
•	Permanently	reducing	the	threat	to	 
  civilians will require coercive and/or  
  destructive operations in numerous areas  
  at the same time, which will fall outside the 
  capabilities and domain of the UN 
•	Mass	killing	of	civilians	can	intensify	and	 
  expand very quickly once it begins
Response •	Any	military	response	should	seek	to	target	 
  irregular forces and special units rather  
  than regular armed forces/heavy weapons
•	UN	forces	may	become	targets	themselves	 
  the moment they seek to confront  
  genocidaires
 
•	Consent	may	be	lost
Consolidation •	There	is	much	potential	in	the	role	of	UN	 
  military forces to consolidate the situation 
•	The	principal	contribution	UN	military	 
  forces can make is to prevent subsequent  
  violence, especially communal conflict or  
  post-conflict revenge
•	The	ability	to	consolidate	depends	on	the	 
  role the UN has played during the actual  
  events
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6 Monitoring and evaluation
User guide
This chapter provides suggestions on how to monitor and evaluate protection efforts. The main audience is JMAC/
JOC and other analytical units with the task of measuring progress of mandate fulfillment. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is essential to measure the implementation of POC in any UN operation. According 
to the UN’s POC Policy, joint military, police and civilian M&E teams will assess the mission’s response to all major POC 
incidents or crises and report their findings to the mission leadership and UN Headquarters. Dedicated mission-wide 
monitoring activities related to the implementation of the POC mandate will ideally be undertaken regularly, based on 
clear benchmarks and indicators. The overall purpose is to identify trends that can help decision-makers understand 
how people are  
being killed, displaced or harmed and whether the UN response requires adjustments. The DPKO and DFS have  
recently developed guidance on Protection of Civilians indicators (see Annex A). 
Different ways to measure protection of civilians. Based on the key characteristics and expected outcomes of each  
scenario, it is possible to help identify what to monitor and how to assess whether protection of civilians is actually 
being achieved in different situations. 
In general, there are at least five ways to measure physical protection of civilians:
•	 Civilian	casualty	figures	(e.g.	number	of	casualties,	people	displaced,	people	forcibly	recruited)	
•	 Civilian	behavior	(do	civilians	stay	or	flee?	Who	do	they	flee	from,	and	where	to?)	
•	 Perception	of	security	(what	are	the	civilians’	primary	concerns?	What	do	they	fear	the	most?)
•	 Shifts	in	territorial	control	(as	this	is	associated	with	increased	violence	against	civilians)
•	 Perpetrator	capabilities	(e.g.	the	ability	to	conduct	many	large-scale	massacres	simultaneously,	 
 freedom of movement for regular forces, access to deadlier weapons)
Focus on relevant metrics. In general, monitoring civilian casualties will be relevant in all operations, but requires 
focus on the relevant numbers. When certain groups of civilians are targeted, their casualty figures must be measured 
against that group’s population rather than the total number of civilians in the area. Civilian behavior, perception of 
security, and shifts in territorial control may provide additional metrics to assess protection of civilians in situations 
where violence is not overwhelming. Perceptions of security may in some cases be more important than the number 
of attacks, keeping in mind that the perception of what is meant by security may vary significantly. Combining these 
metrics with civilian casualty figures is likely to provide a more comprehensive assessment of whether the threats to 
civilians in different situations are actually being reduced or not.
From a strictly military-planning perspective, monitoring perpetrator capabilities is perhaps the most relevant task, 
because these capabilities represent the means by which perpetrators acquire the ability to attack civilians – and  
because these capabilities can be reduced by military presence and responses. Assessing perpetrator capabilities  
will be particularly relevant in the most violent scenarios, in which perpetrators are most dependent on numerous  
capabilities to execute the violence. By assessing a perpetrator’s capabilities to conduct other forms of violence, it is 
also possible to measure the potential for further violence – or at least the perpetrator’s ability to carry it out. 
The table suggests how protection of civilians can be measured and effectiveness assessed in each of the scenarios.
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Scenario Relevant metrics
Mob violence •	A	reduction	in	the	number	and	scale	of	riots	is	a	primary	indicator	of	success	as	these	are	 
  pre-conditions for the perpetrator to use violence against civilians and destroy/loot property.
•	Very	few	civilians	will	be	killed	in	this	scenario,	but	the	perception	of	threat	amongst	the	 
  population at large may be significant and could be monitored and evaluated to trace to what  
  degree it changes and the extent to which affected communities feel threatened. 
•	The	level	of	material	damage	can	be	monitored,	but	any	assessment	should	differentiate	 
  between ‘regular’ looting for profit and more targeted attacks against symbolic buildings/ 
  structures. If the latter occur, it could point to a more strategic use of violence and the potential  
  for escalation into post-conflict revenge or other more dangerous scenarios. 
•	Interviewing	victims	of	violence	may	help	understand	whether	or	not	the	violence	is	purely	 
  opportunistic or based on another motivation. It will be important to strictly follow humanitarian  
  guidelines to avoid putting victims in more danger by association with protector/state. 
Post-conflict 
revenge
•	During	post-conflict	revenge,	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	civilians	subjected	to	criminal	acts	 
  of violence (murder, arson, kidnapping, looting) will be the primary indicator of success in  
  protecting civilians.
•	A	reduction	in	the	freedom	of	movement	for	individuals	or	mobs	seeking	revenge	will	be	the	 
  principal (and perhaps only) indicator of success based on perpetrator capabilities. 
•	Greater	freedom	of	movement	for	civilians	associated	with	former	perpetrators	(e.g.	the	ability	 
  to travel outside their ‘safe sites’) will be a key indication of successful reduction in the threat of  
  post-conflict revenge.
•	The	potential	for	escalation	into	other,	more	violent,	scenarios	can	be	assessed	by	monitoring	the	 
  number of attacks against whole groups of civilians associated with the former perpetrators and  
  their perception of threat. This may indicate how easily these groups may flee in large numbers if  
  more violence breaks out. 
Insurgency •	During	insurgencies,	the	greatest	indicator	of	protection	success	is	a	reduction	in	the	total	figure	 
  of civilians killed, injured or displaced – and not merely a reduction in civilian casualties caused  
  by own military actions (‘collateral damage’). A certain degree of success is achieved when  
  physical security is no longer the primary concern of the civilian population.
•	Protection	is	also	achieved	when	the	number	of	shifts	of	territorial	control	and	the	fear	of	 
  retaliation from both sides are minimized. 
•	Reducing	perpetrator	capabilities	to	target	civilians	is	possible	by	denying	them	access	to	 
  particular types of weapons that are responsible for civilian casualties (such as IEDs or suicide  
  bombs). However, the weapons or tactics used will be very context specific and likely to change  
  over time as the insurgents adapt to the protector’s counter-measures.
Predatory  
violence
•	During	predatory	violence,	the	greatest	indicator	of	success	is	a	general	reduction	in	the	number	 
  of civilians killed, injured, displaced and abducted.
•	Protection	is	also	achieved	if	the	number	of	civilians	fleeing	as	a	result	of	violent	incidents	nearby	 
  is falling and their general perception of threat is reduced, as predatory perpetrators rely on  
  spreading fear to coerce civilians into submission. 
•	Protection	is	also	achieved	by	destroying	the	perpetrator’s	ability	to	operate.	However,	this	may	 
  lead to retaliation against civilians nearby, which needs to be monitored closely.
Table 6.1     Monitoring and evaluating protection of civilians in each scenario
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Scenario Relevant metrics
Communal 
conflict
•	During	communal	conflicts,	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	retaliatory	attacks	is	perhaps	the	 
  greatest indicator of protection success. 
•	The	perception	of	threat	in	both	communal	groups	may	be	more	important	than	the	actual	 
  number of civilians killed during each round, as fear of being attacked is the principal motivation  
  for launching attacks by both sides.
•	If	the	cycles	of	revenge	attacks	start	to	slow	and	the	perception	of	threat	from	the	other	 
  community is reduced, the primary threats associated with communal conflict are being  
  addressed. However, if threat perceptions only decline for one of the communities involved,  
  this may indicate a lack of protection of the other community. It may also indicate that one  
  community is gaining the military superiority required for more decisive violence, such as  
  ETHNIC CLEANSING. 
•	Successful	protection	through	reducing	perpetrator	capabilities	depends	on	restricting	the	 
  freedom of movement for communal militias from both sides to attack the other community, 
  and denying access to more deadly weapons than are currently available to them.
Government 
repression
•	During	government	repression,	a	general	reduction	in	the	total	number	of	civilians	killed,	injured,	 
  displaced or arrested will be the most basic indicator of success. Here, the overall figure of  
  civilians harmed will be more important than that of a particular group, as civilians are first and  
  foremost targeted on basis of perceived affiliation with the opposition.
•	Reducing	the	number	of	territorial	shifts	of	control	and	the	civilian	population’s	perceived	threat	 
  of retaliation from either side will be another indicator of success. 
•	Protection	is	also	achieved	by	denying	perpetrators	the	use	of	regular	forces	and	heavy	weapons	 
  (e.g. air forces, tanks, heavy artillery), and disrupting the command and control over these forces,  
  and access to weapons of mass destruction. 
•	The	potential	of	other	unfolding	scenarios,	such	as	COMMUNAL	CONFLICT,	ETHNIC	CLEANSING,	 
  or GENOCIDE, can be assessed by monitoring the degree to which civilians begin to flee the  
  mere presence of certain perpetrators and the number of attacks against civilians based on their  
  communal identity. However, in order to conduct the violence characteristic of these scenarios,  
  perpetrators need control over and freedom of movement for other types of military units  
  (e.g. paramilitaries, militias and special units).
Ethnic  
cleansing
•	During	ethnic	cleansing,	the	majority	of	civilians	targeted	(~	90	percent)	are	likely	to	be	expelled	 
  from specific geographical areas. Therefore, a reduction in the number of targeted civilians  
  displaced and the number of their homes destroyed will be primary indicators of success in  
  protecting civilians against ethnic cleansing. The number of civilians killed is a less useful  
  indicator in itself, as this may constitute only a very few of the civilians actually under threat of  
  expulsion.
•	A	reduction	in	the	particularly	brutal	acts	of	violence	that	make	people	flee	in	advance	and	their	 
  perceptions of threat may provide better indicators of success. 
•	Fewer	shifts	of	territorial	control	will	be	another	critical	indicator	of	success,	as	this	is	a	 
  prerequisite for conducting cleansing operations and is associated with peaks in violence. 
•	Successful	protection	based	on	reducing	perpetrator	capabilities	includes	denying	freedom	of	 
  movement for the irregular or special forces (e.g. paramilitaries, militias, police units) that usually  
  conduct the violence on the ground, disrupting perpetrator channels of communication through  
  which expulsion is legitimized, and reducing their ability to coordinate attacks in geographical  
  patterns to create contiguous ethnically pure territories.
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Scenario Relevant metrics
•	The	number	of	civilians	returning	to	areas	from	which	they	have	previously	been	expelled	is	a	key	 
  indication of a reduced threat of expulsion. 
•	The	potential	for	escalation	to	GENOCIDE	may	be	assessed	by	monitoring	the	potential	support	 
  for a ‘final solution’ (whether among the perpetrator leadership or the population in general).
Genocide •	During	genocide,	the	majority	of	civilians	targeted	(50+	percent)	are	likely	to	die	if	the	 
  perpetrator succeeds. Therefore, a reduction in the number of large-scale massacres of civilians  
  belonging to the targeted group will be a primary indicator of success in protecting civilians.
•	Protection	of	civilians	is	being	achieved	when	the	perpetrator’s	military	superiority	in	victim	 
  areas is weakened and the number of killers or highly destructive weapons needed to achieve  
  high death rates is reduced. 
•	At	the	tactical	level,	preventing	or	stopping	attacks	against	locations	or	areas	where	potential	 
  victims are congregated in large numbers is likely to save many lives, because one could  
  reasonably assume that the majority of them would otherwise have been killed. 
•	Changes	in	civilian	behavior	or	threat	perceptions	will	have	least	relevance	as	indicators	of	 
  successful protection in situations where civilians are already faced with imminent threats of  
  physical extermination.
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This document aims to complement existing UN POC guidance with a threat-based  
approach to protection of civilians, focusing on the specific challenges military  
commanders are confronted with on the ground. A key characteristic of current  
operational environments is that civilians are being deliberately targeted by armed 
actors. In some cases, such attacks on civilians result from specific perpetrator strategies 
involving the extermination or expelling of entire groups or communities. However, in 
most cases, armed groups, abusive authorities and rogue militias use violence against 
civilians to survive, to undermine political opposition, or to secure economic rewards 
and other benefits. Different types of perpetrators and rationale often co-exist within the 
same area of operation. Distinguishing between different types of threats and the  
potential role and utility of military force is therefore essential to improve UN military 
efforts to protect civilians. The threat-based approach should help UN military  
commanders, planners and practitioners at all levels of the UN system to enhance their 
understanding of how the military component of a UN peace operation could use force 
more effectively to protect civilians from different types of physical threats.
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